The pronounced increase in external imbalances in the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) during the years running up to 2008 is traditionally explained by financial integration through the common currency. This paper examines in a one-good, two-country overlapping generations' model, with production, capital accumulation and public debt, the effects of financial integration on the net foreign asset positions of initially low-interest and high-interest rate EMU countries. We find that a lower savings rate and government expenditure quota, together with a higher capital production share in the latter can in fact be transformed into the observed external imbalances when interest rates converge.
Introduction and Motivation
The present sovereign debt crisis in the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is partly attributable to the pronounced increase in external imbalances across northern (including center) (= "core") and southern (including Ireland) (= "periphery") euro zone countries during the years running up to 2008 (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2011) . The huge external deficits in the periphery during the pre-crisis period are "traditionally explained" (Chen et al. 2012, p. 6 ) by financial integration after the inception of the common currency (e.g. Lane 2006 , Coeurdacier and Martin 2009 , Lane and Milessi-Ferretti 2008 .
The immediate convergence of nominal interest rates, a visible manifestation of financial integration, is attributed to the elimination of country-specific currency risks and the reduction of transaction costs as a result of harmonization of financial sector policies and goods market integration (Kamlemli-Ozcan et al. 2010) . As a consequence, and in line with basic neoclassic reasoning, financial capital had been flowing from the richer core towards the poorer periphery (converging) countries, financing the latter's external deficits (Schmitz and von Hagen 2010) . While obvious from a partial equilibrium perspective, the underlying causes of EMU's external imbalances such as core-periphery differences in preferences and technologies are, however, rarely subjected to scrutiny in intertemporal general equilibrium models. 1 It is thus the objective of this paper to examine thoroughly the financial-integration effects of core-periphery differentials in structural and policy parameters, i.e. differences in saving rates, capital production shares and government expenditure quotas, on the net foreign asset positions (external balances) of initially low-interest rate (core) and high-interest rate (periphery) euro countries in a simple one-good, twocountry overlapping generations' (OLG) model with production, capital accumulation and public debt.
As is well-known, after the inception of the euro in 1999, core euro countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, France), in particular Germany, started to run current account surpluses, while the periphery (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain) accumulated huge external deficits, accompanied by a dramatic loss of international competitiveness due to striking increases in their wages and prices compared to core countries. Moreover, there was a significant divergence in the dynamics of private debt between core and periphery (Pisany-Ferry 2012, Figure 4 ): Up to the outburst of the global financial crisis, periphery's debt boomed, mainly in order to finance housing investment, while in the aftermath of the crisis government debt was substituted for private debt.
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While the contribution of financial integration to the emergence of intra-EMU external imbalances is empirically largely undisputed 2 , it remains an open theoretical question whether and how diverging net foreign asset positions, and an increasing periphery's real exchange rate through financial integration, can be attributed to differences in fundamental parameters in an intertemporal general equilibrium model of a heterogeneous currency area. Among the few who address this question are Fagan and Gaspar (2008) who use a two-good, two-country overlapping generations pure exchange model without public debt, à la Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985) , to compare the pre-euro financial-autarky steady state to euro-related financial integration between core and periphery. Fagan and Gaspar (2008) find that the evolution of intra-EMU external imbalances can be traced back to the relatively higher time preference of periphery. The authors justify the neglect of production and capital accumulation in their model by emphasizing "the stylized fact that the creation of the monetary union has not been associated with changes in growth differentials" suggesting "that flows of capital and resulting changes in capital-output ratios have not been, to date, a major part of the story as far as the euro area is concerned." (Fagan and Gaspar 2008, p. 13) While this suggestion is true with respect to non-housing investment it is -as Fagan and Gaspar (2008) themselves note -not true with respect to housing investment. Since we now know with the benefit of hindsight, that housing investment in Ireland and Spain contributed significantly to the evolution of intra-EMU external imbalances the assumption of exogenously given and time-stationary capital endowment by Fagan and Gaspar (2008) remains questionable. 3 Even if the endowment-economy specification is empirically warranted with respect to overall investment and GDP growth, it is still interesting to investigate whether the intra-EMU external imbalances may also be attributed to changes in capital (including housing)-output ratios through financial integration. In particular, it is interesting to know, aside from differences in time preference, whether the core-periphery divergence in external imbalances is traceable to intra-EMU differences in fundamentals such as capital production shares and government expenditure quotas. This is the main research question which is addressed in the present paper.
In order to be able to deal with the effects of the housing capital-output dynamics on the net foreign asset positions, a one-good, two-country OLG model with production, capital accumulation and public debt à la Diamond (1965) and Buiter (1981) is used in this paper. The model features the main stylized macroeconomic facts of EMU's core and periphery before and after the introduction of the common currency. One worth mentioning is the fact that in the period up to the crisis the public debt-to-GDP ratios of several countries in the southern euro area had not risen, they had declined. (Lane 2012, p. 51) Acknowledging moreover the fact that the debt-to-GDP ratios of northern euro zone countries increased 2 In addition to financial integration Chen et al. (2012, pp. 6-7) count among "traditional explanations for the rise of euro area imbalances" "expected growth", "over-optimism" and "excessive real appreciation". Moreover, they point out that "new stylized facts" concerning the euro area imbalances and the rest of the world are also important in fully understanding intra-EMU external imbalances.
3 Giavazzi and Spaventa (2010, p. 7) argue similarly.
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only slightly, the modeling exercise assumes for simplicity that both northern and southern debt-to-GDP ratios stay constant over time.
Introducing public debt into Buiter's (1981) two-country OLG model is equivalent to extending Farmer's (2006) closed-economy OLG model with government debt to cover two countries connected through internationally mobile government bonds and private capital. As regards the notion of the real exchange rate we follow Ljungqvist (1988) and Lin (1994) in defining periphery's real exchange rate as the ratio of southern to northern (real) wage rates.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the main stylized macroeconomic facts, existing both before financial integration and during the euro zone integration up to the outburst of the financial crisis in 2008 are assembled. In the following section, the basic log-linear, Cobb-Douglas OLG model is separately specified for the pre-euro financial autarky period and for the financial integration period after euro inception. After deriving the respective equilibrium dynamics, the existence and dynamic stability of steady-state solutions before and after financial integration are thoroughly investigated. With these results at hand, it is then shown how the southern net foreign debtor position throughout the process of financial integration can be traced back to the relatively lower savings rate and lower government expenditure quota and the larger capital production share in the periphery. A numerical model specification is used to show that core-periphery differences in capital production shares and government expenditure quotas contribute significantly to the divergence of intra-EMU net foreign asset positions, in addition to any differences in time preference. The paper concludes by summarizing the main qualitative and numerical results of the modeling approach and by providing suggestions for the set-up of a more realistic model.
Stylized Macroeconomic Facts: Financial Autarky versus EMU's Financial Integration
In order to guide the design of the one-good, two-country OLG model, some stylized facts with respect to the macroeconomic performance of the EMU members before the launch of the euro in 1999 and up to 2008 are gathered in this section. Following Fagan and Gaspar (2008, p. 9) , the euro zone countries are separated into two groups based on the criteria of relative nominal (short-and long-term) and short-run real interest rates in the 1990s, i.e. before the euro launch. The first group, usually denoted as the core countries, comprises low interest rate countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands. 4 The second group, denoted as periphery or converging countries, consists of countries which had relatively high interest rates before the introduction of the euro (see figures 1-2). Legend: periphery, core. Source: Fagan and Gaspar (2008, p. 34) and own calculations using AMECO.
Fig. 2 Real short-term interest rates 1995-2008
Legend: periphery, core. Source: Fagan and Gaspar (2008, p. 34) and own calculations using AMECO.
Figures 1-2 reveal the first macroeconomic fact regarding financial integration since euro inception:
Fact 1: In contrast to the pre-euro area situation (before 1999), there was a sizeable convergence of nominal and real interest rates between euro core and periphery after the inception of the common currency (Fagan and Gaspar 2008, p. 10) . Legend: periphery, core. Source: Fagan and Gaspar (2008, p. 34) and own calculations using AMECO.
Regarding differences in economic fundamentals, figure 3 portrays a substantially lower personal savings ratio (= household savings as percent of disposable income) in the periphery than in the core. In the 1990s and after 2005 it fell more rapidly in the periphery than in the core. Moreover, housing investment (as percent of GDP) rose significantly in the periphery while it declined in the euro core, as can be seen in figure 4 below. Legend: periphery, core. Source: Fagan and Gaspar (2008, p. 34) The message from figures 3-4 can be summarized as follows:
Fact 2: Accompanied by a significantly lower personal savings ratio in euro periphery relative to the core, housing investment expenditures in the periphery experienced a boom, while housing investment declined in the core countries. (Fagan and Gaspar 2008, p. 34) Due to the sharp increase in housing investment in the periphery and the relatively low domestic savings the periphery developed a significant net foreign debtor position as shown in figure 5 below. The final fact (see figure 6 ) concerns the shrinking differences in hourly labor compensation 5 between northern and southern euro zone member countries.
Fact 4:
The southern hourly labor compensation in manufacturing rose quicker than northern hourly compensation, or more precisely: the ratio of southern to northern hourly labor compensation increased from 55% in 1998, to 63.5% in 2008. 
Basic Model
Consider an infinite-horizon economy consisting of two countries, named South, representing the periphery, and North (indexed by *), representing the core of the EMU. In each country, one commodity, In order to describe the optimization problems of households more specifically the institutional framework regarding international transactions across both countries is now addressed. In order to mimic the introduction of the common currency in 1999 within the present highly abstract intertemporal general equilibrium model we follow Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) as well as Fagan and Gaspar (2008) , and assume that before 1999 South and North were financially autarkic, while after the launch of the common currency, South and North became financially integrated. Not surprisingly, financial integration impacts on the choice set and constraints of younger households as well as on market clearing conditions.
In order to work out the consequences of financial integration as clearly as possible, the optimization problems of (younger) households and the market clearing conditions are now described separately for the two cases of financial autarky and financial integration through EMU.
Financial Autarky
In order to facilitate the modeling of the pre-euro situation as financial autarky, we first recall that large real interest rate differences existed between the euro zone core (North) and the euro zone periphery (South) before the creation of the currency union. As figure 2 above shows, southern real interest rates were sizeably larger than the corresponding northern rates. Second, in contrast to the later financial integration of the euro zone, in the 1990s the (negative) net foreign asset position (as percent of GDP) of EMU's periphery was rather modest (see figure 5 above). Hence, when modeling the period before the euro start it is not unrealistic to assume that both the current account and the net foreign asset position of South and North were zero. Third, in contrast to the current post-crisis situation where huge differences in government debt-to-GDP ratios exist between EMU periphery and core, in the late 1990s the unweighted average debt-to-GDP ratio of the EMU periphery was not that different from the corresponding EMU core value. Moreover, the core-periphery debt-to-GDP differences did not widen until the onset of the global financial crisis. Since the objective of the modeling is to explain the intra-EMU development before the financial crisis it is appropriate to assume that the government debt-to-GDP ratios in South and North remain constant over time. Additionally, as figure 3 above shows, the personal savings ratio in EMU's periphery was persistently lower than in the EMU core countries. 7 Finally, in view of the differential development of labor compensations costs across EMU core and periphery, it is natural to assume 8 corresponding differences in southern and northern production technologies.
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Against this empirical background of stylized facts the intertemporal utility maximization problem in South reads as follows: B  stands for the aggregate southern government bonds the southern younger household wants to hold at the beginning of its retirement period. Constraint (i) depicts the working-period budget constraint, while constraint (ii) represents the retirement-period budget constraint.
The southern (and similarly the northern) government taxes labor income and uses the proceeds from additional borrowing to finance the interest costs on existing government debt, government consumption expenditures and subsidies and social transfers. The budget constraint of the southern government reads as follows:
where t  denotes southern real government consumption expenditures, and t B is the level of real southern government debt at the beginning of period t . In line with Diamond (1965) we assume that government (consumption) expenditures are unproductive. While the assumption of unproductive government expenditures accords rather well with EMU periphery's reality, it is clearly more at odds with EMU core's reality.
In addition to the restrictions imposed by agent and firm optimization and by the above government budget constraint, markets for labor and for financial assets have to clear in all periods (the market for the output of production is cleared by means of Walras' Law).
Since the market for financial assets is competitive, transaction and adjustment costs do not occur, no risk (aversion) prevails, the following no-arbitrage condition (= national Fisher equation) holds:
whereby 01   depicts the fixed depreciation rate of private capital (period by period) in South and equally in North.
Moreover, in order to model the fact of time-stationarity of both southern and northern public debt-to-GDP ratios between 1999 and 2008 we transform total outstanding government debt in southern (northern) government's budget constraint into debt-to-GDP ratios. This is achieved by dividing both sides of (5) 
Dividing the asset market clearing condition in (3) on both sides by t Y , and using the definition of the capital output ratio
, the asset market clearing condition can be rewritten as follows:
.
YY t t t t t t t t t t
In view of the CD production function and acknowledging
Remembering the empirical fact that the pre-crisis public debt-to-GDP ratios in northern and southern euro zone countries remained roughly constant over time, we assume a time-stationary public debt-to-GDP ratio:
Moreover, we assume time-stationary government expenditure quotas:
The government budget constraint (5), together with these stationarity assumptions, yields 1
Using the CD production function it is easily seen that
. Thus, the FOC for profit maximizing capital input in (1) can be equivalently written as follows:
In order to simplify the algebra, we assume 1   . Then, acknowledging (8) in (7) and taking into
[ (1 ) ]
The intertemporal equilibrium dynamics of the capital-output ratio in South (North) is obtained by inserting (9) into (6):
(1 )
1 (1 ) (1 )
As usual, a steady-state intertemporal equilibrium is defined as a fixed point of the difference equation
Evaluating (10) at a steady state yields:
Proposition 1 (Existence of steady-state solutions in South 10 )
Then, there are exactly two strictly positive steady-state solutions as follows:
Proof. Since
, the expression in front of the square root is strictly larger than zero.
Moreover, since bb  , the square root is non-negative. Hence, 2 v is real and strictly larger than zero. This is also true for 1 v since the term in front of the square root is larger than zero and the square root is certainly smaller than the term in front of the square root. Obviously, 21 vv  . ■ Since there are two steady-state solutions (local) dynamic stability needs to be investigated. This is done in proposition 2. 
. From (10) we know:
(1 ) (
From proposition 1 we know that there are two solutions 12 vv  which solve the steady-state equation
. Obviously, the slope of the left-hand side of this equation equals unity while the slope of the right-hand side equals (12) is asymptotically stable we are now entitled to inquire whether the empirically observed pre-euro North-South differences with respect to the real interest rates, real wage rates and personal savings ratios can be attributed to North-South differences in household's savings rates, government expenditure quotas and capital production shares. To this end we now proceed in two steps: First, we inspect the larger steady-state solution in (12) to inquire how the fundamental parameters impact the steady-state value of the capital-output ratio under financial autarky. Second, we 12 provide empirical information about the relative magnitudes of the savings rates, capital production shares and government expenditure ratios in pre-euro North and South.
In undertaking the first step, it is helpful to re-write the larger steady-state solution in (12) by using the definition of the savings rates
Comparing the right-hand side of (13a) to that of (13b) we are led to the following proposition. bb  it is easy to see that the first term (in front of the square root) in curly brackets on the right-hand side of (13b) is larger than the corresponding term in (13a). Since bb  implies that both square roots are strictly larger than zero, the square root in (13b) is larger than that in (13a). Hence, * 22 vv  . Equation (8) is empirically warranted since the southern European countries were (are) less developed (lower GDP per capita) than the northern European countries and there are prominent empirical examples for the fact that the capital production share is higher in catching-up than in advanced countries (see Bai and Qian (2010) for the high Chinese capital production share of nearly 50% and Caselli and Feyrer (2007) for the much lower US capital production share of 30%). The opposite holds with respect to the government expenditure quota: less developed countries exhibit lower expenditure quotas than highly developed countries. Since, however, the large Italian economy belongs to the southern bloc, *   is rather close to reality which implies that proposition 3 remains relevant. Finally, in view of the empirical evidence provided by figure   3 above it is natural to assume that *   , i.e. the savings rate of the southern European countries is less than that of northern countries.
Proposition 3 says that under financial autarky the relatively high capital production share and the low savings rate in South imply that the steady-state capital output ratio in South is lower than in North, and is associated with a higher real interest and a relatively low real wage rate. This claim is intuitively plausible. A low savings rate implies for a given capital output ratio relatively low savings, thus driving the capital output ratio down to ensure asset market clearing. The capital output ratio is also depressed by a relatively high capital income share since this implies a relatively low labor income share associated 13 with low per capita savings. Due to decreasing marginal productivity of capital the lower capital output ratio is associated with a higher real interest rate and a lower real wage rate.
Not surprisingly, under financial autarky the southern (northern) net foreign asset position
i.e. no international borrowing and lending takes place in spite of the interest rate differential across countries. Obviously, the costs associated with shifting capital from low-yielding North to profitable South were prohibitively large. When modeling the advent of the common currency we assume that these international capital mobility costs are completely removed over night while the structural parameters of both economies remain as assumed in proposition 3. The consequences of completely removing international capital transaction costs are investigated in the next section.
International Equilibrium under Financial Integration
To mimic financial integration arising through the set-up of the EMU we assume in line with Buiter (1981) and Lin (1994) that both real capital and government bonds can be freely traded across both countries without incurring any transaction costs. In view of the higher interest rate in South, northern younger households will use their savings to invest in southern real capital (including housing) and buy the bonds emitted by the southern government until the southern real interest rate declines as much as there is no longer an incentive to shift northern savings towards the South.
Since the same composite commodity is produced in North and South, financial integration does not induce any trade in goods and services. 12 Thus, while younger households in South cannot choose between consumption of the domestic commodity and of the foreign commodity, they can choose between investing their savings in domestic or foreign real capital and domestic or foreign government bonds. The budget constraint (in real and per-capita terms) of the household living in South, when young is:
Here 1 When old, the budget constraint of period-t young household in South reads as follows:
12 Chen et al. (2012) point out that periphery's current account deficits after euro launch and before 2008 while mainly financed by the EMU core were due to imports from the rest of the world and not from the EMU core. Moreover, core's (in particular Germany's) merchandise exports went mainly to emerging countries like China. Thus, empirically speaking, it is not premature to assume that in our two-country modeling framework there is no trade in goods and services. 14 where 
Under financial autarky, both governments pursue a "constant stock" budget policy. This implies that (net) wage tax rates in both countries become endogenous and that they are determined by equation (7) and by a corresponding equation for North.
Market clearing of the national labor markets in South and North requires:
The union-wide market for southern (northern) real capital clears according to:
The union-wide market for southern (northern) bonds clears according to: 
The union-wide asset market clearing condition requires that the total amount of savings in the union equals the total world supply of assets from South and North:
Having described the optimization problems of households and the market clearing conditions, the intertemporal equilibrium dynamics can now be derived. From equation (8) and from the international Fisher equation (16), the following relationship between northern and southern capital output ratios results:
Dividing (20) 
Using southern and northern production functions, the ratio of northern to southern GDP turns out to be as follows:
Given (23), the definitions of the GDP growth rates and the optimal savings functions (resulting from utility maximization of households) in (22) 
Considering equations (9) and (21) in equation (24) and multiplying the result on both sides by
yields the following first-order difference equation with respect to t v , thus describing the law of motion for the international asset market:
Equation (25) represents the intertemporal equilibrium capital-output ratio dynamics of the one-good, two-country OLG model under financial integration.
The dynamics of the capital output ratio determines the intertemporal equilibrium path of the unionwide real interest rate, southern and northern real wage rates and the real exchange rate between South and North, t e . Here, the real exchange rate is defined in line with Ljungqvist (1988) and Lin (1994) as
As expected, the common real interest rate declines with a rising capital output ratio in South, while the southern (northern) real wage rate increases with a rising capital output ratio in South (North).
13 Lin (1994, p. 97) shows that this definition of the real exchange rate is consistent with those in standard textbooks as e.g. in Dornbusch and Fischer (1990, pp. 184-185) where the real exchange rate e is defined as:
with E standing for the nominal exchange rate, and P and * P being the domestic and foreign price level, respectively. Moreover, the real exchange rate of South increases with a rising southern capital output ratio when *   (as we assumed). (21) and (25) at a non-trivial steady state yields:
Financially Integrated versus Financially Autarkic Steady State
or:
where
) denote the net foreign asset position as a ratio of GDP for South (North) in period 1 t  . Thus, in steady state the southern net foreign asset position is exactly mirrored by a negative position of northern net foreign assets multiplied by the northern to southern GDP ratio.
Before addressing the main question of whether, starting from financial autarky, with both net foreign asset positions equal to zero and the real interest rate in South higher than in North, financial integration necessarily implies a negative southern and a positive northern net foreign asset position, we investigate the more technical questions concerning the existence, uniqueness and dynamic stability of steady states under financial integration.
Regarding the existence of steady-state solutions one has to explore whether equation (30) exhibits a strictly positive solution for the southern capital output ratio. Casual inspection of equation (30) immediately reveals that in general an explicit solution is infeasible. To facilitate the existence analysis we proceed in two steps: First, we investigate the existence of non-trivial steady-state solutions for the special case of "similar" production technologies across North and South. Production technologies are said to be similar if total factor productivities differ across North and South
) but southern and northern capital production shares are identical. Second, the more technical analysis of the general case of internationally differing capital production shares is dealt with in the appendix.
In the case of similar technologies 0   , and thus equation (30) collapses to the following secondorder polynomial:
Proposition 4 (Existence of non-trivial steady-state solutions under similar technologies)
then there are exactly two non-trivial steady-state solutions as follows:
. (33) Proof. The proof is similar to that of proposition 1. ■ Since there are again two non-trivial steady states, an analysis of the dynamic stability of both solutions is in order. The result is exhibited in proposition 5. 
and the equation
. It is easily seen that . Financial integration means that the positive differential between southern and northern interest rates under financial autarky diminishes as the southern interest rate declines and the northern interest rate rises. A decreasing marginal productivity of capital means that the decline in southern interest rate is associated with a rise in the southern capital output ratio and that the increase in northern interest rate is associated with a fall in the northern capital output ratio. Remembering the definition of the southern net foreign asset position in steady state as
, differentiation of  with respect to v yields (26) and (27) for the non-trivial steady state, it becomes immediately apparent that the common real interest rate is lower than southern autarkic real interest rate and that the southern real wage rate is higher and the northern real wage rate is lower than the corresponding autarkic values. However, it still remains unclear whether the ratio of southern to northern real wage rate or the southern real exchange rate is higher or lower than in financial autarky. This question is clarified by corollary 1. Proof. On evaluating equation (28) in the steady state, we obtain a positive relationship between the real exchange rate and southern capital output ratio when the southern capital production share is larger than the corresponding northern share. Since under financial integration the southern capital output ratio rises from its pre-integration value, the real exchange rate, defined as the ratio of southern to northern real wage rate, rises too. ■
A Numerical Ilustration
Before concluding, a numerical specification of the basic model is used to illustrate both its explanatory power and its limitations. The parameter values are chosen such that the model is able to roughly reproduce the main stylized facts listed above under financial autarky, and to accord with the assumptions in the propositions above. The structural and policy parameters are as follows: Net foreign asset position 0
=0
Net foreign asset position 0
Note that the yearly southern (northern) interest rate exhibited in table 1 is not too far from the real interest rates in the late 1990s portrayed in figure 3 . Similarly, household savings ratio for South and for
North shown in Table 1 corresponds roughly to the personal savings ratios in EMU core and periphery exhibited in Figure 3 above. Finally, zero net foreign asset positions in South and in North shown in Table 1 accord approximately with the small net foreign debt in EMU periphery and the small core net foreign credit prevailing in the late 1990s ( Figure 5 ). 14 Both capital production shares and time preference factors are calibrated such that a 1987-1997 average core (periphery) yearly real interest rate of 5.3% (3.6%), a core (periphery) household savings ratio of 16.7% (14.8%) and a ratio of periphery to core real wage rate of 55% are reproduced by autarky model solutions. 1987-1997 average government expenditure quotas and debt-to-GDP ratios are taken from the AMECO data base.
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Before comparing the results in Table 2 to those in Table 1 note that the southern ratio of net foreign assets to GDP in Table 2 corresponds to the value reported in Fig. 5 for 2007 , but that the northern net foreign credit to GDP ratio, exhibited in Table 2 , is clearly too large compared to the close-to-zero value in Figure 5 . Here, the limitations of the two-country approach (neglecting the rest of the world) become apparent.
The comparison of the results in Table 2 to those in Table 1 reveals several interesting insights. First, through financial integration (equalization of southern and northern real interest rates) periphery's capital-output ratio (including housing and residential objects) increases while core's capital-output ratio decreases, mimicking the development of housing investment relative to GDP in the periphery versus the core portrayed in Figure 4 . Second, southern (net of subsidies and transfers) wage tax rate decreases markedly while the northern wage tax rate increases, but to a lesser extent. This is due to the pronounced decrease of southern real interest rate, and to the much less pronounced increase of northern interest rate.
Third, through financial integration both southern (northern) working-period and old-age consumption increase (decrease). Southern working-period and old-age consumption increase since through financial integration the southern (net) wage rate and savings rise more than the interest rate decrease. Northern working-period and old-age consumption decrease due to the lower wage rate and smaller savings.
Fourth, in contrast to Gaspar and Fagan (2008) who report utility increases through financial integration both in periphery and in core, life-time utility in our model increases in South but decreases in North.
Fifth, while the savings ratios under financial autarky generated by the model are roughly in accordance with the empirical facts exhibited in Figure 3 , the model predicts in contrast to Figure 3 , an increase in periphery's savings ratio. Moreover, the increase of southern real exchange rate from 0.55 towards 0.57 represents only 25% of the actual rise documented in Figure 6 . Here, another limitation of our model setup becomes obvious: the exclusion of over-optimistic convergence expectations which were, according to Lane and Pels (2012) , another important driver of external imbalances and the appreciation of periphery's real exchange rate.
Before concluding it is worth mentioning that pre-euro differences in all three fundamentals contribute to the explanation of the emergence of external imbalances among core and periphery. However, without a higher periphery capital production share periphery's real exchange rate would not appreciate.
Moreover, numerical simulations of alternative fundamental parameter sets show that periphery-core differences in capital production shares and in government expenditure quotas contribute more to the explanation of periphery's external deficits than differences in savings rates.
Concluding Remarks
This paper explores, within a simple one-good, two-country OLG model with production, capital accumulation and public debt, the role of divergences in core-periphery fundamentals in the emergence of external imbalances in the EMU, from the inception of the common currency to the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008. It models the pre-euro situation as financial autarky, and the EMU before the global financial crisis as financial integration, characterized by complete convergence of real interest rates. After assuring the existence and dynamic stability of financial autarky steady states, a lower savings rate, an equal government expenditure quota and a higher capital production share in South were shown to imply the empirically observed southern high real interest rate and low real wage rate associated with no external imbalances between South and North before the advent of the common currency. Symmetrically, the higher savings rate and government expenditure quota and the lower capital production share in North implied a northern low real interest rate and a high real wage. After the inception of the common currency, free capital mobility between South and North induced immediate international real interest parity leading to a quick fall in southern interest rates and to rising northern interest rates. Simultaneously, relatively high initial southern interest rates led the northern core to invest their wealth in southern housing and residential objects. Thus, both northern and southern external balances widen: the EMU periphery becomes a net foreign debtor while the EMU core becomes a net foreign creditor. Moreover, with the faster rising southern real wage rate, the southern real exchange rate appreciates.
We may thus conclude that the one-good, two-country OLG model is capable of reproducing qualitatively, the main stylized facts presented above: a declining real interest rate for southern EMU countries, rising southern external debt and northern external credit, and a rising real exchange rate which diminished the international competitiveness of South. Proposition 3, 6 and corollary 1 corroborate the claim that the emergence of external imbalances between northern and southern euro zone countries after financial integration can be traced back to fundamental North-South differences in savings rates, government expenditure quotas and capital production shares.
To some extent the OLG model enables us to attribute intra-EMU external imbalances to South-North differences in such fundamentals. However, a numerical specification of the basic log-linear CD OLG model also exhibits the limitations of the highly stylized model setting. Among them, we have in the periphery a rising personal savings ratio instead of the empirically observed decline and an insufficiently rapid increase in periphery's real exchange rate. One reason is that nominal variables such as price levels, nominal interest rates, and the quantity of money, do not play any role in the basic model. Neither monetary nor fiscal policy is present. Moreover, the agents in this model do not form 'bubbly' price expectations, i.e. prices leading to cumulative divergences from fundamentals. Indeed, Lane and Pels (2012) find that exaggerated growth and income expectations in the EMU periphery have contributed significantly to their huge external imbalances.
How to extend the analysis of this paper in future research is obvious. These necessary extensions comprise e.g. a second non-tradable good as in Fagan and Gaspar (2008) and inclusion of bubbly expectations in asset prices, in line with Carvalho et al. (2012) . In order to differentiate properly between un-productive housing investment and productive non-housing investment, a three-period overlapping generations' model in line with Japelli and Pagano (1994) would be in order. Where EMU external imbalances during and after the crisis are also to be subject to scrutiny, then non-Walrasion 22 underemployment equilibria à la Rankin (1987) or involuntary unemployment à la Farmer (2012) also have to be introduced into the basic model.
